Dumas v. Kitchen : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1999
Dumas v. Kitchen : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
William R. Morse.
James H. Woodall; Littlefield & Peterson.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Dumas v. Kitchen, No. 990582 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1999).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2246
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
RANDALL DUMAS,
Appellant, Case No. 990582 CA
vs.
RHONDA KITCHEN.
Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
On Appeal from Decree of Adoption
Entered in the Third Judicial District Court
of Salt Lake County, Utah
Judae J. Dennis Frederick
William R. Morse
1311 West Kodiak Way
South Jordan. Utah 84095
JAMES H. WOODALL (5361)
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City. Utah 84102
Telephone (801) 531-CR3H CQ
• • ?m
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
RANDALL DUMAS,
Appellant. Case No. 9905S2 CA
\s.
RHONDA KITCHEN,
Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
On Appeal from Decree of Adoption
Entered in the Third Judicial District Court
of Salt Lake County, Utah
Judsze J. Dennis Frederick
William R. Morse
1311 West Kodiak Wav
South Jordan, Utah 84095
JAMES H. WOODALL (5361)
LITTLEFIHLD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City. Utah 84102
Telephone (801) 531-0435
TABLE OF (ONTENTS
JURISDICTION
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ARGUMENT
CONCLUSION
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases p-iL'e
Matter of Adoption of B.O.. 92~ P.2d 202. 208 (Utah App. 1996) 9
Bremholt v. Breinholt. 905 P.2d 8". SS2 (Utah App. 1995) 5
State e\ rel F.D. v. l-.J.I).. 938 P.2d 29S. 3nl (Utah App. 1994) 2
State in Interest of F.H.. 880 P,2d 11. 13 (Utah App. 1994) N
In re J.D.M.. $08 P.2d 1122. 1124 (Utah App. 1991) 2
In re J.N.. 960 P.2d 403. 407 (Utah App. 1998) 2
Nilson \. Nilson. 652 P.2d 1323. 1324 (Utah 19S2) (>
State e\ rel R.N.J.. 980 P.2d 345 (Utah App. 1995) 9
Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d "3. ~9 (Utah App. 1991) 4
Statutes
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) 1
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-407 2. 9
Utah Code Ann. cj 78-3a-40S 3.9
JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann.. See. 78-2a-3(2)(h).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The issues presented to the Court for review is (1) whether there was
sufficient evidence for the trial Court to conclude that appellant ("Randall") abandoned
his children, thereby terminating his parental rights and granting the adoption of his
minor children by the children's stepfather, Robert A. Martinez.
Randall is challenging the adequacy of the findings of fact on these
points. Findings of fact are subject to the clearly erroneous standard ol review. State
ex rel ET). v. E.J.P., 938 P.2d 298. 301 (Utah App. 1994). A finding is clearly
erroneous if it is against the great weight of the evidence or if the Court is otherwise
definitely and firmly convinced that a mistake has been made. In re J.N.. 900 P.2d
403. 407 (Utah App. 1998). To challenge the sufficiency of the trial court's findings,
an appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate
that despite this evidence, the Court's findings are so lacking in support as to be
against the clear weight of the evidence. In re J.P.M.. 808 P.2d 1122. 1124 (Utah
App. 1991).
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
A. Section 78-3a-407. Utah Code Ann.:
The Court may terminate all parental rights with respect to one or both
parents if it finds any one of the following:
(1) that the parent or parents have abandoned the child ....
(6) that only token efforts have been made by the parent or
parents:
(a) to support or communicate with the child:
(b) to prevent neglect of the child:
(el to eliminate the risk of serious physical, mental, or
emotional abuse of the child; or
(dl to avoid being an unfit parent.
B. Section ~8-3a-4(>8. Utah Code Ann.:
(1) In determining whether a parent or parents have abandoned
a child, it is prima facie evidence of abandonment that the parent or
parents:
(b) have failed to communicate with the child by mail,
telephone, or otherwise for six months;
(O failed to have shown the normal interest of a natural
parent, without just cause.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioners Robert A. Martinez and Rhonda L. Martinez filed a Petition
for Adoption on January 14. 1999 for the adoption of Antonio R. Kitchen, born
January 22. 1988. and Julian A. Kitchen, born February 17. 1989. Both children were
born as issue to the marriage of Rhonda F. Martinez and Randall K. Pumas.
Mr. Dumas was properly notified of the proceeding, and he tiled an
Answer which denied that he had abandoned the children. Following a trial on Mav
19. 1999. the Court terminated Mr. Dumas's parental rights and granted the adoption.
Mr. Pumas retained new counsel and fled the present appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. Randall failed to marshal the evidence which supported the Court's
findings and then demonstrate that such evidence was insufficient to support the
findings. If the party challenging the findings fails to marshal the supporting ev icence.
the trial court's findings will not be disturbed on appeal. Rudman v. Rudman. 812
P.2d 73, 79 (Utah App. 1991). Randall has made only a token effort to marshal the
evidence, and there is no basis to even consider disturbing the trial court's findings.
2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Randall's
parental rights, The Court made detailed findings which support its decision to
terminate RandalFs parental rights. There was no abuse of discretion, and the trial
court's decision must be affirmed.
3. Randall was represented by competent counsel. RandalFs counsel
cross-examined the witnesses and offered the direct testimony of Randall in opposition
to the petition. RandalFs representation was competent and effective.
4. The statutory criteria for abandonment are constitutional.
RandalFs challenge to the constitutionality of the abandonment statutes is misplaced.
First, he did not raise this issue at trial. Second, this Court has already determined the
statute to be constitutional. Third, the statute merely provides for the establishment of
a prima facie case of abandonment when a parent fails to contact a child for six
months. Here the evidence was uncontroverted that Randall had failed to contact his
children for years.
ARGUMENT
I. Randall failed to marshal the evidence which supported the Court's
findings and then demonstrate that such evidence was insufficient to support the
findings. A party challenging the trial court's findings of fact is required to marshal
all evidence which supports those findings, and then demonstrate the evidence to be
legally insufficient to support the findings. Breinholt v. Breinholt. 9()5 P.2d S". 882
(Utah App. 1995). If the challenging part)' fails to properly marshal the evidence, the
trial court's findings will not be disturbed, UL
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that "all
statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by
citations to the record...." Randall's "Facts." beginning at Page 1 of his Brief do not
contain a single citation to the record. Moreover, his facts misstate the record: For
example, he claims that "in search of employment appellant thereafter sojourned to
California." Mr. Pumas testified that he went to California "because I couldn't deal
with what was going on." Tr. p. 29. Also, in his facts, appellant states that "Mr.
Pumas made a number of attempts to contact his children but was prevented from
doing so by appellee." In his testimony, when asked whether he blamed petitioner for
his inabilitv to see his children. Mr. Pumas replied. "Not at all." Tr. P. 32.
The marshaling rule was adopted to ensure that the Appellate Court
would not be put in the position of retiying the ease without seeing or hearing, the
witnesses. See Nilson v. Nilson, 652 P.2d 1323, 1324 (Utah 1982) ("This court is
reluctant to reconsider evidence that a trial court is in an advantaged position to weigh.
Our removal from the participants in a trial puts us in the disadvantaged position of
reviewing testimony from a cold record.")
Randall has failed to properly present his appeal, and this Court should
assume that the record supports the findings of the trial court.
2• The trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating RandalFs
parental rights. Even if Randall had properly marshaled the evidence in support of the
findings, which he failed to do, he must show some abuse by the Court in making this
determination. The trial court had the opportunity to weigh the credibility and
demeanor of the parties. Randall may disagree with the decision, but there was
nothing about it that would permit the appellate court interpose its own judgment in
this matter.
The records shows that the Findings are rationally based on the evidence
presented. Findings 4 through 9 demonstrate the correctness of the Court's decision:
4. Here Mr. Pumas has acknowledged that he failed to
communicate with either child for at least six years, having not seen
either child since at least September 1992, and perhaps earlier.
5. Mr. Dumas's last communication with either child was a
birthday card he sent to the older child. Antonio, in Januarv 1993.
6. Flic boys have no recall of Mr. Dumas. Thev do not know
who he is. and thev certainly do not recognize him as their father. Their
father, in their mind, is Robert Martinez.
7. Mr. Dumas's conscious disregard of his parental obligations
led to the destruction of the parent-child relationship.
8. Mr. Pumas acknowledged that he has never made a
voluntary payment of child support. He is seriously delinquent in his
child support obligation, currently owing Rhonda approximate!) S5(H)I|{).
As a result of Mr. Dumas's failure to support his children. Rhonda was
required to obtain public assistance.
9. While Mr. Dumas is now paying child support, the Court
observes that such payments is prompted by compulsion through the Utah
Office of Recovery Services.
The trial court must make rationally based findings from the evidence
presented. The record indicates that the trial court properly earned out this function.
Randall was represented bv competent counsel. ~\'o successfully
challenge a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Randall must show that
counsel's performance was objectively deficient and that counsel's deticient
performance prejudiced the case. State in Interest of E.H., 880 P.2d 11, 13 (Utah App.
1994). Randall has not met this burden.
While Randall suggests that counsel could have presented character
witnesses on his behalf, he fails to acknowledge that the evidence was largely
undisputed: On direct examination by his own counsel, Randal! admitted that he had
not spoken to the children in seven years. Tr. 30. He admitted that upon his return to
Utah in April 1993, he made no effort to establish contact with the children. Tr. 31.
When asked whether he blamed his ex-wife for his inability to sec his children,
Randall's response was ."not at all." Tr. 32. When asked "were you wrong'/,"
Randall's response was, "I was wrong." Id.
On cross-examination, Randall admitted that he knew where the children
had lived since at least 1992. Tr. 38-39. He admitted that he had been employed
continuously since 1993, but that he ruid "made a mistake" in not paying child support.
When asked his best estimate of what ae owed in back child support, Randall replied,
"S48,699." Finally, when asked, "do you think those boys know who you are,"
Randall answered, "Probably not."
In light of this evidence, there was arguably nothing counsel could have
done. Randall has not demonstrated any prejudice in his counsel's representation.
I". 'I he statutory criteria for abandonment are constitutional. Cif ng
only the Constitution. Randall now argues that $ij 78-3a-407-4()8 are unconstitutional.
Without addressing the constitutionality issue, it should be noted that Randall did not
raise this challenge at the trial court level. Consequently, he mav not raise it on
appeal. State ex rel R.N.J.. 980 P.2d 345 il tah App. 1995). The three exceptions
Ijurisdiction, plain error, and exceptional circumstances) do not apply.
Moreover, this Court has already sustained the constitutionalitv of cj ^8-
3a-40"(oi in Matter of Adoption of B.C. 92" P.2d 202, 208 (Utah App. 1996]. While
not specifically addressing the six month prima facie language of cj 7S-3a-4os. the
Court's main focus was on whether the parent "evidenced a conscious disregard for his
or her parental rights." jd. That is what the trial court did here. By his own
admission. Randall had not seen his children in vears. He made no effort to rebut the
prima facie case of abandonment that he established by his own actions, fherc is no
basis to even consider the constitutionalitv- of c^ ~8-3a-4()8. as there was ample
evidence to terminate RandalFs rights under ij ~8-3a-407(6).
CONCLUSION
The trial court properly exercised its discretion. It entered Findings of
Fact which show a careful, thorough examination of the evidence. Randall has tailed
to marshal any evidence in presenting his challenge. This failure alone precludes the
Court from granting the relief he requests. RandalFs appeal is without merit.
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